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The Kargil Crisis: An Overview

The Kargil Crisis: An Overview

by Abdus Sabur

Pakistan's policy towards India has been determined by its historical stance on the Kashmir issue, which remains at the centre of the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Pakistan's arms build up has been designed to achieve strategic parity with India. Following the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998, Islamabad had two major concerns. The first was how to manage the post-nuclear security relationship with India. The second was how to capitalise on its recently acquired nuclear status to break the deadlock on the Kashmir issue. Similar motivations, which had also played in the minds of the Indian leadership, resulted in the Lahore Summit between Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on February 20-21,1999. The Lahore Declaration, a Memorandum of Understanding and a Joint Statement, signed during the Summit worked out a host of fundamental rules for the management of military-strategic relations between the two countries after they had demonstrated their nuclear capabilities.

The second concern emanated from the fact that the Pakistani leadership came to perceive its nuclear capability as contributing to a favourable settlement of the Kashmir issue. As seen from Islamabad, its nuclear capability was to act as a deterrent and as a lever, that would neutralise India's conventional superiority. This line of thinking generated a confidence in the Pakistani mind that it could afford to initiate a low level operation in Kashmir with a view to internationalising the dispute or, if possible, to put the issue back on the international agenda. Thus, a prominent Pakistani analyst came to assert seriously that following the nuclearisation, Islamabad found itself in "a favourable international climate for addressing the Kashmir dispute, and to solicit UN intervention, or other forms of third-party mediation". It is against this backdrop that Pakistan planned its Kargil operation, notwithstanding the fact that Islamabad was well aware of the dangers of the potentials of such a venture.

1. How Pakistan became isolated

Fearing that the confrontation could spin out of control, Western governments, the UN and Russia urged caution and appealed to the two sides to pull back. International concern focussed on protecting the fledgling confidence-building measures, which were set up by the Lahore Summit to deal with the two countries' new status as nuclear powers. Initially, the US was even-handed publicly, though privately Washington put the onus squarely on Pakistan and asked the latter to pull out its men. The European Union also has sent a similar message to Islamabad. Russia - a long time ally of India - embraced New Delhi's view without any hesitation.

Even a staunch ally like China distanced itself from Pakistan. Sharif who went to Beijing on a six-day visit on June 28 with great expectations had to come back empty-handed on June 29. The Chinese leaders urged both sides to settle the Kashmir dispute and as Premier Zhu Rongji told Sharif, it can "only be resolved by peaceful means".

The Kargil adventure, or rather misadventure, made Pakistan quite friendless in the international arena. India on the other hand, has earned remarkable sympathy amongst the international community, particularly the US, for prudently restricting its military operation against the intruders to its side of the LoC in Kashmir.

2. Was there ever a risk of a full scale war

A central question remains whether there was a possibility of Kargil developing into a full-blown war between India and Pakistan. Such a possibility hardly existed.

First of all, Pakistan could not and did not design its operation to evolve a military solution to the Kashmir dispute. Its objective was to internationalise the Kashmir dispute with a view to involving the international community in the process of its resolution. India with firm international support behind it was determined to recapture its territory. Going beyond that would have served no purpose and involved high politico-diplomatic and military costs as well as a very high degree of risk. Indians were clearly aware of all this. A highly renowned Indian strategist, K. Subhramanyam, articulated the situation as follows: "Pakistan wants to take the Kashmir issue to the UN. India wants to rectify the intrusions. Neither side has any objective that warrants full-scale war".

It is against this backdrop that side by side with fierce fighting in the Kashmir Valley intense diplomatic efforts aimed at defusing the crisis continued unabated. Despite the failure of Sartaj Aziz's visit to India, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Niaz Naik, visited India during the end of June as a special envoy of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and India welcomed the Pakistani envoy. Among others, Niaz Naik, also meet Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee.

3. The Role of the United States

From the very onset of the crisis, the US was determined to hold the ring between the two belligerents. The US maintained regular contacts with the leadership of both the countries including at the highest level. Top US officials, both diplomatic and military, visited India and Pakistan with a view to bridging the differences between the two countries. Meanwhile the US had to work under tremendous time constraints.

The gains on the diplomatic front encouraged India to show restraint and refrain from crossing the LoC in Kashmir. However, at least two factors, highly disproportionate casualty rate and the impending general elections, were pushing India to do some thing quickly. Those options included, among others, the crossing of the LoC in Kashmir. As suggested by a former Chief of Staff, Indian Army, General Shankar Roy Chowdhuri, "From a military perspective, there are really no logical solutions that do not involve crossing the Line of Control." The US was alarmed at such line of thinking in New Delhi because it could result in a large-scale war between India and Pakistan with unpredictable consequences. Avoiding such a confict was the central US objective in the region.

Such prospects compelled the US to put a high degree of pressure on Pakistan to withdraw from the Indian part of Kashmir. In an attempt to create pressure on Pakistan, the US dispatched General Anthony Zinni, head of the US Central Command, to "give an ultimatum to Sharif and Pakistan's powerful generals". Implicit in Zinni's warning was the threat that "the US would not bailout Pakistan if India decided to launch a major attack across the Line of Control". The US also threatened to block a US $100 million tranche of an IMF loan to be disbursed to Pakistan soon. The G-8 countries sent an even tougher private message to Sharif threatening to suspend all multi-lateral and bilateral aid to Pakistan. Ultimately, the pressures worked. Sharif decided to go to Washington with a view to finalising the ways and means of defusing the crisis.

Following a three hour meeting between US President Bill Clinton and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Washington on July 4, 1999, the two leaders issued a joint statement that signalled an end to the Kargil crisis. The carefully worded statement included an agreement between the two leaders on the following issues:

The Clinton-Sharif statement accommodated all the demands made by India. In practice as well, Pakistan undertook appropriate measures with a view to withdrawing the forces backed by Islamabad from the Indian side of the LoC in Kashmir. A meeting to this effect was held between the Director Generals of military operations of both the countries. The meeting worked out modalities of withdrawal. Some of the militants groups made attempts to resist the Pakistani move, but in vein. By the end of July, the Indian army was able to recapture the territory it lost in May this year. Thus, the Kargil crisis came to an end.

Given Pakistan's difficult predicaments in the battlefield, its diplomatic isolation, the precarious domestic economic situation and its excessive dependence on the US and its allies for economic and military assistance, Islamabad's susceptibility to US pressure is easily understandable. However, the acquiescence of India to the crucial role played by the US in defusing the Kargil crisis has initially been surprising. But the Indian motives are not difficult to understand.

From the very beginning of the Kargil crisis, the US has taken a clear position that the current crisis over the Kargil was essentially due to Pakistani infiltrators crossing the LoC in Kashmir. At first privately and then publicly the US made it clear that Washington held Pakistan responsible for the whole mess. With regard to a resolution of the crisis, President Clinton's Advisor on South Asia in the National Security Council, Bruce Riedel, made it clear that "those who infiltrated from the Pakistani side to Indian (side) must go back". The US also indicated that if Pakistan continues to display intransigence, Washington might be forced to accept a possible Indian retaliation across the LoC in Kashmir.

Another important factor, was that Washington was firmly opposed to the internationalisation of the Kashmir question and did not support Pakistan's attempts to bring it before the United Nations Security Council. The US position on the Kargil issue coincided with that of India. Washington was also ready to work for a solution that would satisfy all the Indian demands. In the circumstances, it became a matter of convenience for India to allow the US to play the crucial role it did in defusing the crisis and the BJP government allowed it to happen. However, the policy did not enjoy unanimous support. Certain circles in India criticised the BJP government for allowing the US to play a role in resolving the Kargil crisis as it was against the long-professed Indian policy of resolving conflicts with the neighbours bilaterally without third-party intervention.

4. The long term impact of the crisis on Pakistan-India relations - the many Kargils to come.

With the withdrawal of Pakistan-backed militants from the Indian part of Kashmir, the Kargil crisis came to an end and Indo-Pakistan relations Returned to its normal course, a course marked by perennial mistrust, numerous conflicts and occasional crises. To a certain extent, the situation has turned from bad to worse. The Kargil episode has left a deep imprint on Indo-Pakistan relations. In view of the understanding reached in Lahore, New Delhi considers the Kargil episode as a "betrayal of trust" by Pakistan. Restoring Indian trust of Pakistan's leaders will be difficult and time consuming. With the impending general elections in India, a meaningful dialogue between the two countries is on nobody's agenda.

Pakistan has developed a habit of being severely humiliated. The Kargil episode that initially appeared to be a victory ultimately came to be seen in Pakistan as "an ill-thought-out adventure" . The Pakistanis consider the withdrawal humiliating for the country, though Nawaz Sharif is trying his best to play down the consequences of the blunder. His assertion that Pakistan had succeeded in internationalising the Kashmir issue is far from impressing the populace. Khalid Qayyum, chief reporter, The Nation newspaper, assessed the outcome of Kargil episode as "Pakistan's worst-ever defeat on the diplomatic, political and media fronts". Fundamentalist forces in Pakistan are trying to portray Sharif as having betrayed Kashmir and develop a Pakistani sense of being defeated by India. Public ire is so hot that Sharif may face a battle for his political survival. In the event, he will have to rely on cultivating nationalist passion directed against India in order to gain popular legitimacy. Sharif's recent assertion in Lahore that Pakistan is capable of giving a "mouth-breaking" response to any aggressor is indicative of such a trend. In the circumstances, the situation in both the countries is working, at least for the time being, against the resumption of any meaningful dialogue between the two countries on the issues of mutual discord.

By compelling India to fight a battle on Pakistan's terms, in a place and at a time chosen by Pakistan, Islamabad has severely embarrassed the Indian army in Kargil and the Indian government before the people. According to Indian sources about 400 soldiers died in the Kargil episode. Western defence experts put the figure at more than 1,000. Whatever may be the real figure, it remains the bloodiest encounter between India and Pakistan since 1971. Capitalising on these factors, certain circles in India are trying to mobilise public opinion and articulate a hawkish policy towards Pakistan. How far all these will influence the shaping of long-term popular opinion in India as well as India's practical policy towards Pakistan still remains an open question.

With the end of the Kargil crisis, Pakistan's problems have just begun. Being viewed globally as an aggressor, isolated in the international arena, humiliated in the Kargil, and more importantly, with ever worsening domestic political and economic crises, Pakistan may undergo a difficult process of development with unpredictable consequences.

The resolution of the Kashmir problem - the central issue in the Indo-Pakistan conflict - will continue to remain as illusive as ever. No possible combination of forces in power in New Delhi could afford to satisfy Pakistani claims on Kashmir. On the other side, even a humble Pakistan - defeated in 1971 - did not accept the Indian version of the resolution to the Kashmir issue: namely, the final division of the state between India and Pakistan along the LoC. Thus, the Kashmir problem is certain to persist for long time to come.

As indicated earlier, the Lahore Declaration and Kargil are the ideas that have been simultaneously prevalent in the mind of Pakistani elite. Notwithstanding the humiliation suffered by Pakistan as a consequence of its Kargil misadventure, the situation is likely to remain the same. The elite in Pakistan is quite candid about this. Even in the wake of Kargil debacle, Pakistan Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz asserted without any hesitation that, "if Kashmir is not resolved, there will be many more Kargils". In the circumstances, the Kargil crisis is likely to be remembered as one of many crises that India and Pakistan have undergone in the past and are likely to undergo in the future.

About the Author

A.K.M Abdus Sabur is the Senior Research Fellow at the Bangladsh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), in charge of South Asian Studies. He has been in his present post since 1991. Dr Sabur was a Ford Foundation Fellow and Visiting Scholar, Columbia University, New York, Sep 86- July 87. His latest publications include "Nuclearisation of South Asia: Challenges and Options for Bangladesh" and "Bangladesh-Bhutan Relations: An Overview". Present fields of study include, domestic politics and interstate relations with particular reference to security and co-operation in the region and conflict management and resolution with particular reference to South Asia. He is the editor of ' Bangladesh Foreign Policy Survey' and Associate Editor BIISS journal.

This paper is a draft of an article soon to be published in the BIIS journal. Further information about the journal and the activities of BIIS can be found at the BIIS website.

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