Andrew Pinchin
Doctoral Student
Email: Andrew.Pinchin@arts.monash.edu.au; Andrew.Pinchin@gmail.com
Thesis:
Working Title
On the Content of a Foundational Objective Moral Value
Supervisor
Advisor
Abstract of Thesis
This thesis aims to address the question of what would be the content of a foundational objective moral value assuming there is at least one such value. My present concern is with analysing G.E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy in Principia Ethica and the literature that has arisen since its initial (1903) publication ultimately with a view to considering what influence the values of living morally, living well and living meaningfully would have on the content of such a foundational objective moral value.
I am also however interested in how these issues interact with issues more generally in metaethics and welcome questions in either this area or any other aspect of postgraduate philosophy at Monash.
Academic Background:
- PhD candidate, Sep 2008 - Sep 2011 Monash University
- BA (Hons), 2008 Monash University
- LLB 2007, Monash University
Primary Interests in Philosophy:
Metaethics; normative ethics; the philosophy of philosophy; Continental philosophy – esp. Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir; metaphysics; philosophy and popular culture.
Primary Interests in Law:
To be considered in much more detail in the future, but presently: Criminal, Evidentiary, Corporate and Administrative law.
Publications:
‘'No Evidence' and 'Mistake of Fact': A Reconsideration’ (2007) 52 AIAL FORUM December: 59-85.
Outside interests:
Primarily: swimming, juggling, certain science-fiction fantasy literature, film, self-development.