

AUSTRALASIAN POLITICAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE

24th-26th September 2007
Monash University, Melbourne

Panel Stream: International Political Economy and Comparative Politics
Panel Convener: Dr Remy Davison
Paper Title: *EU-Africa Relations: Between Development Co-operation and Conflict Prevention*
Authors: Dr Patrick Kimunguyi
Monash European and EU Centre, Monash University
Patrick.Kimunguyi@arts.monash.edu.au

Abstract

In the post-cold war period, conflict prevention has increasingly become a central feature in the European Union's relations with sub-Saharan African (SSA) states. This paper seeks to examine the role of the EU in preventing conflict in Africa. It argues that the EU's involvement in conflict prevention and resolution in Africa is driven by the dual aim of becoming more visible as a major international actor and also enhancing its presence on the continent. To this end, since the 1990s, the EU has been re-inventing development cooperation, instruments for humanitarian assistance. It has also been creating instruments for crisis management within the framework of its Common Foreign and Security Policy. By so doing it has placed itself in a position to better exercise its influence on conflict prevention on the African continent. Firstly, this paper reflects on the post-Cold War discourse on EU policy towards Africa. Part Two focuses on the EU's development cooperation policy as a conflict prevention instrument; Part Three examines the EU's response to humanitarian crises; Part Four, examines the EU's policy on conflict prevention in Africa within the CFSP framework and Part Five is the Conclusion.

Key words: *European Union, Development co-operation, conflict prevention in Africa*

I. Introduction

The end of the Cold War provided the European Community/Union (EC/EU) with the opportunity to realise its ambition to become a key international actor.¹ In this period, the discourse regarding the EU's policy towards Africa has taken place in two strands. The first strand of this discourse has been within the frameworks of EU's development cooperation with ACP² states and humanitarian assistance, which has

¹Hill, C. and Smith, M., "International Relations and the European Union: Themes and Issues" in C. Hill, and M. Smith (eds), *International Relations and the European Union*, Oxford University Press, 2005; Cameron, F., 'The EU as a Global Actor: far from pushing its political weight around', in C. Rhodes (Ed), *The EU in the World Community*, Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp.19-44; Bretherton, C. and J. Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, London: Routledge, 1999.

²The abbreviation 'ACP' refers to Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, which at present, constitutes 78 countries, including 48 of the 54 African States. The 5 Mediterranean States belong to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (1995) and South Africa has signed a specific Trade, Development

dominated the agenda since the 1990s. Lome IV/bis Convention introduced political conditionality by incorporating clauses on human rights, democracy and good governance and rule of the law as an 'essential' part of the cooperation.

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) introduced other major changes towards strengthening political dimensions of the partnership. Other new changes to the cooperation included a broad range of political issues that fall outside traditional development cooperation. They include issues such as peace and security, arms trade, and migration. Human rights, good governance, rule of law are now 'essential' elements of the relationship, whose violation by a country could lead to suspension of EU aid. Cotonou has extended partnership to new actors including civil society groups and the private sector. It also introduces a new WTO compatible trade policy of regionally focused Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), intended to be effective from January 2008 and a more rationalised and performance based aid management.³

The second strand of this discourse was parallel to the EU's development cooperation. This was when European institutions were making efforts, in the early 1990s, towards establishing ways of preventing conflicts in Africa.⁴ Bretherton and Vogler note, in this period, many actors were particularly lobbying strongly for reinforcement of the EU's international position through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),⁵ which has now become an important instrument in this regard.

The predicate question is why should the EU focus on sub-Saharan Africa especially in the area of conflict prevention and development cooperation? Olsen explains that "sub-Saharan Africa remained on the post-cold war foreign policy agenda of the EU simply because the region became one of the elements of the effort to develop 'Europe' into a significant international actor."⁶ But there are also more compelling reasons for the increase in the EU's interest in the region.

Firstly, the geographical proximity of Africa and Europe has ensured a close, but not always harmonious, relationship between the two continents for many centuries. Long before the systematic colonisation of Africa in the 19th century there were significant trade links and a history of the exchange of cultural ideas and developments, marred by the slave trade. Colonialism not only imposed European dominance on the African continent, but it also strengthened ties between particular countries, especially in the use of common languages such as English and French. In spite of African countries' independence, a number of former European countries, for example France, the United Kingdom (UK), Portugal and Belgium, have maintained close relations with their former colonies.⁷

and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU in 2000. The agreement is formally passed between the ACP group and the EC, as the EU has no legal personality yet.

³Kimunguyi P., 'From Lome to Cotonou: An Assessment of the European Union's Trade Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries,' *Journal of International Relations No. 33:1-2*, Warsaw University, Scholar Publishers, July 2006; ECPDM, *Innovations in the Cotonou Agreement (4)*, Cotonou Infokit: Maastricht: ECDPM, 2001.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶Olsen, G. R., 'Challenges to Traditional Policy Options, Opportunities for New Choices: The Africa Policy of the EU' *The Round Table*, Volume 93, No. 375, July 2004, pp.425-436.

⁷ Ibid.

Secondly, Europe has also kept very close economic links with Africa. In fact, to Africa, trade and investment with Europe has remained of particular importance and the EU is the main trading partner for almost all African countries.⁸ Africa also receives most of its foreign investment from Europe pioneered by leading investors such as France, the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom (UK). Inflows from these countries (including the United States of America and South Africa) to the continent represented more than half of the inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2005.⁹ Such economic relations links trigger the direct interest of governments and businesses in Europe in promoting sustainable development. The rationale behind this is that investment in, for example, infrastructure and governance initiatives are helpful in creating a favourable environment for investment.

Thirdly, it is not only economic interests that underlie European involvement in Africa, but the growing awareness in Europe that Europe's security interests are very closely linked to those of its neighbours. The EU's Security Strategy (ESS) expresses this awareness by stating that Europe now faces threats which are diverse, hidden and unpredictable such as terrorism, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime, and that they are located in the world's poorest and poorly governed regions.¹⁰

For Europe, the increase of migrants from Africa is a significant challenge. Africa's population is growing rapidly and there are plenty of economic incentives for workers to seek employment in the developed world, whether legally or illegally. The sharing of languages and the geographical proximity between the Africa and Europe obviously encourages this trend. This also involves the movements of refugees in conflict-torn countries from Africa. Thus, although relations between the EU and Africa have been predominantly economic, development and humanitarian oriented, they have also been shifting to encompass promotion of security, stability and democracy.

While examining the role of the EU in preventing conflict in Africa, this paper argues that the EU's involvement in conflict prevention and resolution in Africa is driven by the dual aim of making the EU more visible as a major international actor and also enhancing its presence on the continent. To this end, the EU has been re-inventing development cooperation, instruments for humanitarian assistance since the 1990s. It has also been creating instruments for crisis management in the framework of the CFSP. By so doing, the EU has placed itself in a position to better exercise its influence on conflict prevention on the continent. Firstly, this paper reflects on the post-Cold War discourse on the EU policy towards Africa. Part Two focuses on the EU's development cooperation policy and how it has been re-invented into a conflict prevention instrument; Part Three examines the EU's humanitarian assistance with

⁸Kimunguyi P., 'The European Union and Developing Countries: The Challenges of Trade Liberalisation in the Cotonou Process', refereed paper presented at *The 3rd Conference of European Union and Asia Pacific Association of European Studies*, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan (8-10 December, 2005), can be accessed

at, http://www.soc.nii.ac.jp/eusa-japan/download/eusa_ap/paper_PatrickKimunguyi.pdf; See also, http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/index_en.htm (accessed 4 April 2007).

⁹ *World Investment Report 2006*, United Nations, Overview.

¹⁰ Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12, December 2003.

specific regard to the establishment of ECHO as an instrument for responding to humanitarian crises; Part Four, the EU's policy on conflict prevention in Africa within the CFSP framework and the Conclusion identifies challenges ahead for further EU involvement in Africa in the area of conflict prevention.

II. EU Development Cooperation Policy

Development cooperation is one of the main significant features of the EU's relations with sub-Saharan Africa. It can be asserted that development cooperation and the perceived strategic economic and security interests of the EU in sub-Saharan Africa enables the EU to be comparatively well placed, in relation to other external actors¹¹ operating in Africa, to have profound impact on the prevention of conflicts. Three reasons justify this claim.

First, the EU is the largest international donor of development aid to Africa. According to the Development Committee (DAC) of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC), the EU and its member states provided approximately 64% of the world's aid flows in 2004.¹² And together with its member states, the EU provides about 67% of the total aid of DAC Members official development assistance (ODA) that goes to the sub-Saharan region.¹³ This aid is set to increase as the EU and its Member States have committed themselves to meeting the UN's target of 0.7 per cent of combined gross national income (GNI) by 2015, which other non-EU states are less likely to achieve. At least half of any new financial resources found over the next decade has been promised to Africa.¹⁴

Second, along with its renewable and contractual agreements with the ACP countries, the EU is well placed, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, to get involved and effect issues regarding dimensions of cooperation at national, sub-regional and regional levels in Africa, which includes the question of tackling the challenges posed by conflicts in Africa. The EU and ACP states have launched a joint institutional framework,¹⁵ which provide the EU with the space (at political diplomatic and developmental levels) to leverage patterns and influence communication, not only between the two groups, but also with other international actors in sub-Saharan Africa.

Third, from a psychological perspective, the EU, unlike its member states, "is not stigmatised by a colonial past and it has repeatedly tried to distance itself from the colonial history of many of its member States."¹⁶ Hence, the EU has a relatively positive image among social and national elites in Africa.

¹¹This not only includes international actors for example, the United States, but also the EU's member states themselves (Ibid.).

¹²Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Development Co-operation Report 2005*, Paris, 2006, p.158.

¹³European Commission, *The Reform of the Management of the European Community's External Assistance: An Overview* Report October 2002, p 2.

¹⁴Council of the European Union, 'Resolution of General Affairs and External Relations Council [8817/05],' Brussels 24 May 2005.

¹⁵These joint institutions are respectively: the ACP-EU Council of Ministers; ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly; ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors; Centre for the Development of Enterprise and Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Development.

¹⁶Ibid.

Fourth, the EU enjoys a relatively positive image within the social and national elites in Africa. It emphasises the need to pay attention to the role of ethnic, national, and regional identity groups in many African conflicts. This is illustrated clearly in the Development Council's observation in 1998 that aid "should be designed and implemented in a way that it helps to address the root causes of conflict in a targeted manner (...) through supporting measures towards balancing political, social, economic and cultural opportunities among the groups with varying identities in recipient countries."¹⁷ Aid should also provide sound mechanisms that could foster peaceful conciliation of authority of groups and yet this is an area on which development cooperation has little leverage. Thus, an approach for including these groups in development projects as well as in peace negotiation processes could be an indirect form of political recognition with profound effects on conflict.

This paper concentrates on the significant feature of development cooperation, which puts particular emphasis on the political dimensions of the EU-ACP relationship that can have profound influence on conflict prevention in Africa. Notably, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement has strongly politicised EU-ACP relations.¹⁸ It is now structured around three pillars, namely preferential trade relations, development aid through European Development Funds (EDF) and a permanent political dialogue. It is necessary to illustrate the gradual introduction (in the Lome Convention) of political conditionality in the EU-ACP relationship and demonstrates how it gives the EU profound influence over the recipient states.

The EU-ACP development cooperation has been constructed historically on a contractual basis beginning from the first Lome Convention (1975).¹⁹ Through this contractual approach, the EU allocates a given amount of funds to the EDF based on a 5-year rolling programme. In the beginning, the first Lome Convention identified the importance of respect of the sovereignty and self-determination of partners, which practically prevented the EU from using its aid as 'carrot' or 'stick' in its relations with ACP countries.²⁰

Indeed, the EU's development cooperation policy towards ACP countries has been steadily politicised since the mid-1980s, when references to political norms were introduced, which became legally binding²¹ at a later stage. According to Carl, the ACP States began this process, when they asked for a reference to the respect of

¹⁷The Council of the European Union, *The Role of Development Cooperation in strengthening peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution*, Conclusions adopted by Development Council on 30 November 1998.

¹⁸Kimunguyi, P., 'Changing Paradigms or Symbolic Rhetoric? Perspectives on the European Union's Development policy,' Conference Paper prepared for the 29th Annual Conference of African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific, Macquarie University, Sydney 20-22 September 2006. See also, Loisel, S., 'The Politicisation of the EU-ACP Relationship after the Cold War', paper prepared for the 33rd ACES Annual and 8th Research Conference, Newcastle, 2-4 September 2003.

¹⁹De facto, Relations between the EU/EC and Africa stretch as far back as the Treaty of Rome (1957). They were followed by the Yaoundé Conventions (1963-1975), that were signed shortly after independence of former French colonies plus Madagascar and established an "association" between the EEC and the former French colonies and Madagascar The Lome Convention (1975), signed after the accession of Britain to the EEC, abandoned the term and adopted 'co-operation' between EEC and ACP countries.

²⁰The First Convention of Lome, 28 February 1975, Article 2.

²¹Ibid.

human rights as a common “belief” in the third Lomé Convention of 1985. And this was because the African countries wanted to stigmatise the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which continued to maintain spanning economic relations with the South African apartheid regime. But, the EC insisted of its inclusion in the annex rather than in the main body of the Convention.²²

However, towards the end of the 1980s, the circumstances had changed and it was the EU/EC’s member states that were exerting pressure to include human rights, democracy and the rule of law clauses in the body of the Lomé IV Convention.²³ Later in 1995, the revised Lomé IV Convention, declared these values as “essential” to what the Convention was seeking to achieve. It further developed the possibility to suspend EU development aid, without clear elaboration,²⁴ but it introduced a consultation procedure determining circumstances of aid suspension.

Lomé’s successor, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (2000) fills this gap by establishing a formal procedure for aid suspension in the event of gross abuse of human rights.²⁵ It has also, unlike Lomé, introduced mechanisms for potential aid reduction, through a new rolling programme and potential adjustment of Country Strategy Papers (CSP), especially in relation to the so called ‘conflict-fuelling’ regimes. Furthermore, Cotonou has also made the already envisaged in Lomé IV/bis, mid-term reviews of development cooperation, more systematic, which in turn allows for a certain level of aid and resource redistribution, with the aim of re-compensating good performing countries, and limiting or denying poor performers funds that have not been utilised.²⁶

Hence, it can be argued that the EU-ACP relationship came to allow for the use of development cooperation as a diplomatic tool in its negotiations with ACP countries, which as Reiterer observes, gives the EU a powerful political leverage and influence over its partners.²⁷ This can be illustrated by way the EU in used this tool, as was the case, when aid to Togo was suspended. In 1993, EU aid to Togo was suspended as the country was experiencing a very strong “democratic deficit” in the aftermath of elections, which had been biased and characterised by large scale fraudulence of national resources, political assassinations and arbitrary arrests.

A number of EU member states also followed the EU’s example and sanctioned Togo on a bilateral basis. But one significant player, France, did not endorse sanctions to Togo because it had strong alliance with the Togolese regime.²⁸ The domestic situation did not significantly change, and General Eyadema was re-elected to

²²Carl, G., ‘Return to Colonialism? The New Orientation of European Development Assistance,’ in Marjorie Lister (ed.), *New Perspectives on European Union Development Cooperation*, West View Press, 1999, p.116.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Revised Forth EU-ACP Convention of Lomé , 4 November 1995, Article 366.

²⁵ Cotonou Partnership Agreement, (article 96)

²⁶Kimunguyi, P., ‘AID: A Critical Review of the Dialogue on ‘Poorly Performing Countries’, *Journal of International Relations*, No.31:1-2, University of Warsaw, Scholar Publishers, 2005, pp.155-172.

²⁷ Reiterer, M., ‘Inter-regionalism: A New Diplomatic Tool, European Experience in East Asia,’ Paper presented at the 3rd *Conference of European Union and Asia Pacific Association of European Studies*, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan (8-10 December, 2005), can be accessed at, www.soc.nii.ac.jp/eusa-japan/download/eusa_ap/paper_MichaelReiterer.pdf (accessed 24 May 2007).

²⁸ Ibid.

Presidency in June 2003, following his modification of the Constitution to the extent of disqualifying his opponents. Ayadema, who ruled until his sudden death in 2005, was succeeded by his son Faure Gnassingbe.

In search for re-shaping its image, General Ayadema's regime embarked on leading a number of initiatives within the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) structure that aimed at resolving conflict in the Cote d'Ivoire. Other initiatives included inviting ACP ambassadors in Lome to meet opposition leaders and human rights association representatives. In 2003, the European Council began engaging in formal political dialogue with Togo, to reinforce democracy and the rule of law, which led to the Togolese government towards declaring the policy of making democracy "real" in the country. In February 2005, General Ayadema died and his son Faure was sworn in as President. However, international pressure forced him to step down 20 days after assuming the seat and in April 2005, elections were held and Faure Gnassingbe won the elections vowing to concentrate on the promotion of development, the common good, peace and national unity in the country. In December 2005, Togo received the first EU aid since 1993. In 2006, Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg) decided to resume cooperation with Togo. In June 2007, the EU and Togo concluded an agreement on the funding of the support program for the 2007/2008 electoral process in Togo aimed at securing a favourable environment for the conduct of the general elections, reinforcing the capacity of civil society organizations in the domain of electoral observation, as well as strengthening the surveillance of media utilisation.

Despite these events in Togo, a number of analyses on political conditionality as an element of EU aid have been conducted. For example, analyses for the period after the Lome IV/bis (1995), revealed that a small number of aid sanctions were adopted. For example, one study illustrates the way such measures were restricted to human rights abuses as has been the case in the Sudan or Libya in the 1990s; or to cases of striking disruption of fragile democratic processes, for example the *coups d'Etat* in Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger and Togo. In other instances, cooperation was only streamlined to encompass cases of civil and internal conflicts, such as Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia.²⁹ Richard Youngs, for example, points to the example of Nigeria, which was sanctioned only after the elimination of Ogoni activists in 1995³⁰ Indeed, aid suspension, as Young notes, has characteristically occurred too late after tensions, security and civil strife strategies have reached alarming levels.³¹ This was also the case in Zaire — the present-day Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zambia, Kenya and Zimbabwe.

In explaining these few occurrences of aid sanctioning, Arts and Loisel note that from a procedural perspective, the consultation process is theoretically reciprocal. But practically, the decision making power rests in the hands of the EU.³² As in the case

²⁹Kimunguyi, P., 'The Security-Development Nexus in EU-ACP Relations' paper presented at the *Monash 'New Europe, New Governance, New Worlds?' Conference* organized by the *Monash European and EU Centre Melbourne*, Australia (12-14 April 2007).

³⁰Richard Y., "European Union Democracy Promotion Policies: Ten Years On," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 6, 2001, p.356.

³¹Ibid.

³²Arts, K., "Development Co-operation and Human Rights: Turbulent Times for EU Policy." in Marjorie Lister (ed.) *New Perspectives on European Union Development Cooperation*, West view Press, 1999, pp. 7-28; Loisel, S., 'The Politicisation of the EU-ACP Relationship after the Cold War',

of Ayadema, many other African leaders such as the late Mobutu and Mugabe³³ seem to hide behind their privileged relations with particular member states of the EU. Even if the very possibility of aid suspension on the part of the EU might act to exert influence on reform, the reliance of African leaders on these privileged relations with particular EU members and on the consequent divisions within the Council to effectively block most sanctions hinders the impact that political conditionality might otherwise have.

From a regional perspective, political conditionality can be used against the neighbouring states supporting the rebel movements - provided that there is sufficient political will and a regional approach to development cooperation.³⁴ The difference between France and the UK on Rwanda is a good illustration of the diverging interests of states and political conditionality, while focussing on neighbouring countries. Since 1997, the UK began to fully support Rwandan regime under Paul Kagame.³⁵ This new regime perceived France as an enemy for having supported the former extremist Hutu regime, which was largely responsible for the 1994 genocide. Notably, according to Loisel, although France had strong reservations on the democratic nature of Rwanda and withheld part of its bilateral aid, the UK provided the Rwandan government with a large package of aid to target direct budgetary support.³⁶

However, circumstances changed given the fact that the British and French were to operate jointly in Ituri, DRC during the 2003-Operation *Artemis*.³⁷ The two would have their interests heading towards convergence following the success of Artemis mission (see Part Four of this paper). At this time, however, the EU adopted a common position in relation to interfering parties. This was mainly in order to stop them from supporting their respective militias in the DRC. Aldo Ajello, the EU Special Representative in the Great Lakes region and High Representative for CFSP partially used informal political conditionality, notably during the EU's High Representative's visit to Kampala, Uganda and Kigali Rwanda, in July 2003.³⁸ For Madhias, and Tomas, such "covert 'carrots' and 'sticks' probably helped to stop the Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma offensive in Northern Kivu at the beginning of July, which was potentially threatening the stability in Ituri and about which the EU Operational Headquarter in Paris had asked the COPS for diplomatic action."³⁹ This illustration shows that conditionality can also be useful, in influencing regional dimensions of conflict management in Africa.⁴⁰

paper prepared for the *33rd ACES Annual and 8th Research Conference*, Newcastle, 2-4 September 2003.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid

³⁵ Loisel, S., 'The Politicisation of the EU-ACP Relationship after the Cold War', paper prepared for the *33rd ACES Annual and 8th Research Conference*, Newcastle, 2-4 September 2003.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷International Security Information Service, Europe, 'Operation Artemis: Mission Improbable?' *European Security Review*, No. 18, July 2003. For details, visit, <http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/download/operation%20artemis,%20mission%20improbable%20-%20esr%2018.pdf> (accessed 26 May 2007); (More on Operation Artemis in section three).

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Madhias A., and D. Tomas, 'The European Union and the Transformation of Conflicts: Theory and the Impact of Integration,' Paper presented at the *CESA/SA Convention*, Cape Town University, South Africa, 2-6 June 2006.

⁴⁰Ibid.

On aid, the EU member states pledged to increase their official development assistance (ODA) at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000. The aim of this promise was mainly to secure resources for reaching the MDG targets, one of which is to reduce the number of people living in extreme poverty by 2015. Later, the EU declared its full commitment and dedication to the MDGs on several occasions. For example, at the EU's Barcelomna summit in March 2002, EU member states reached agreement on allocating at least 33% of their individual GNI for ODI by 2006.⁴¹ The goal was later revised upwards as the EU countries agreed to reach 0,51% of individual GNI in development aid by 2010 and 0,7% by 2015. And in the context of this paper, it is important to observe that a decision was reached that about 50% of the increased aid should be directed to Africa.⁴²

Along with this increase in aid, there has also been a striking shift in the geographical flows of aid. Between 2000 and early 2006, some aid recipient countries had increases in amount of aid, but others experienced reduction in EU aid. For example, EU aid to the Cote D'Ivoire was reduced by more than 70%. From 2001, while aid to Kenya dropped between 2001 and 2003, the country witnessed very high increases of aid flows between in the years 2004 and 2005. Between 2001 and 2005, the Democratic Republic of Congo saw an increase in EU aid of about 500%; Mozambique about 200 %; and EU aid to Sudan increased up to about 1000 %.⁴³

From the above, it is clear that there is high political precedence in allocating aid for conflict prevention and crisis management and this is also reflected in aid allocations to Sudan and the DRC. Firstly, apart from being a major concern for the EU's security and defence Policy, these two countries have been in chronic conflict (Sudan) and a post-conflict condition, and it is here that aid can be one of the most crucial stabilising instruments (as in the Togolese case). Secondly, this rise in aid flows to crisis-torn countries reflects the EU's commitment to the MDGs.⁴⁴ Consequently, as typical examples of the most marginalised countries in Africa, the DRC and the Sudan top the list of the EU's aid recipients, based on the levels of poverty and hard circumstances of their populations. Lastly, in spite of these two motifs, EU assistance and policy towards Africa is a reflection of the necessity to develop a coherent and efficient for CFSP with an aim of increasing the role of the EU internationally.

III. The EU and Humanitarian aid

This part of the paper examines the degree to which the EU's humanitarian assistance is significant and relevant tool that supports the EU's objective of establishing an effective foreign and security policy in order to affirm its position as a key

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Council of the European Union, *Presidency Conclusions: Brussels European Council 16 and 17 June*, Brussels 15 July 2005.

⁴³Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Development Co-operation Report 2005*, Paris, 2006.

⁴⁴For example, at the UN Summit on Millennium Development Goals, the EU's Commissioner for Development noted, "the European Union has geared its development policy firmly towards poverty reduction. We share the vision of the UN's Millennium Declaration: a world free from want," <http://www.jpn.cec.int/PHPprintPage.php> (accessed at 4 June 2007).

international player, especially in Africa.⁴⁵ Przetakiewicz notes that following the frustration of the EU's incapability to effectively deliver humanitarian assistance during the crisis based on the war to liberate Kuwait in 1991, a decision was reached to establish (ECHO) in 1992.⁴⁶ But, as Holland and Olsen have argued, there were also underlying political interests of the EU to possess an institution, specifically, in the humanitarian area, and both these "purposes aimed at fulfilling a third motive, which had nothing to do with the sufferings of the victims in the numerous emergency situations. It was to give the European Community much more international visibility in an area that is very visible in the media."⁴⁷ However, it is worth noting that from 1995 to 1999, ECHO attracted global attention through its large range of intervention⁴⁸ from former Yugoslav Republic to the Rwandan refugee camps and storm devastated countries in the Caribbean.

Although it is a commonplace view that humanitarian aid is driven by selfless, moral and ethical motivations, the establishment of ECHO could also be understood as a means through which the EU could re-organise its humanitarian assistance.⁴⁹ Its importance in the EU's external policy is also reflected in the extensive financial resources allocated to humanitarian assistance by ECHO and EU member states on a bilateral basis, the EU and its member states being the largest provider of humanitarian aid. For example, according to ECHO, EU commitments in the 1990s, accounted for 53-54% of the global humanitarian assistance on the average⁵⁰ and ECHO's separate contributions to this accounted for around one-third of the amount placing it among the top global donors of humanitarian aid.⁵¹

Strikingly, ECHO statistics show that about 37% of all humanitarian assistance from the EU was allocated to Africa in the period between 2000 and 2006.⁵² These statistics indicate a continuous increase in EU's humanitarian aid since the 1990s, which in part, can be interpreted as a strategy of the ECHO to realise the EU's humanitarian aid policy of directing assistance to crisis-torn regions, in which other donors were hesitant to intervene, because of lack of media attention, such as the crisis in West Sahara. The EU, however, as Dalia notes, in the early 1990s "lacked a real foreign policy, so it needed a body to carry its flag overseas. It was a paradox that that the EU was one of the main financial contributors in responding to humanitarian crises, yet no one was aware of its role since NGOs or UN agencies executed the

⁴⁵Holland, M. 2002, *The European Union and the Third World*, Palgrave, Hampshire, 2002, p.100; Olsen, R., "Between development policy and foreign policy ambitions: The European Union Strategy for Africa" Paper prepared for *EUSA 10th Biennial International Conference*, Montreal, May 17-May 19, 2007, p.14.

⁴⁶Przetakiewicz, J, 'The European Community Humanitarian Office: A Political Tool?', *Collegium - Journal of College of Europe*, No.12. October 1998, pp.42-45.

⁴⁷Haglund, A., "The EU and Humanitarian Assistance," in Cosgrove-Sacks C. & Santos C., *Europe, Diplomacy and Development*, Pelgrave, New York, 2001, pp.154-155; Olsen 2006, p.15.

⁴⁸Emma Bonino, cited in Haglund, A., 2001, pp.156.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰European Commission, *Communication from the Commission on Assessment and Future of Community Humanitarian Activities*, [COM(99)468 final, Brussels, 26 November 1999.

⁵¹European Commission, *Communication from the Commission on Assessment and Future of Community Humanitarian Activities*, [COM(99)468 final, Brussels, 26 November 1999.

⁵²European Commission, *Key Figures of ECHO humanitarian Assistance*, at http://ec.europa.eu/echo/statistics/echo_en.htm (accessed at 24 June 2007).

operations.”⁵³ Olsen and Cosgrove Sacks share the common view that this pattern of aid allocation to Africa shows that the EU is making efforts towards pursuing a coherent and consistent foreign policy.⁵⁴

Overall, in the period since the 1990s, the EU has increasingly integrated humanitarian assistance into its foreign policy. It can be argued that humanitarian assistance is being channelled to areas of political importance to the EU. It can provide visibility of the EU as an international actor, given the media attention accorded to these crises. And Africa is a centre of focus for the EU because of the many emergency and post-emergency crises in the region, such as in the Great Lakes region (DRC, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Burundi, Chad and more recently the Horn of Africa mainly in the Sudan and Somalia conflicts).⁵⁵

IV. Conflict Prevention in the CFSP

a. Conflict Prevention

This part of the paper examines the concept of conflict prevention and how it can be understood in the context of the European Union. The European Commission defines conflict prevention as “actions undertaken over the *short term* to reduce manifest tensions and/or to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict.”⁵⁶ However, this definition contradicts the April 2001 European Commission’s Communication on Conflict Prevention in which conflict prevention is distinguished, not only as the projection of long-term stability, but also as a quick and short term reaction to emerging conflicts i.e. crisis management).⁵⁷ Long-term conflict prevention, in the Communication seems to imply a spectrum of actions such as supporting regional integration, building trade links, supporting democracy, rule of law, civil society, gender equality in development policy, etc., while the short term actions encompass early warning systems, rapid reaction mechanism, and the use of special representatives.

It is important to note that both the European Commission and the European Council identify this differentiation between long and short-term measures.⁵⁸ This definition has been further elaborated in further EU documentation to mean (a) preventing a conflict from escalating into a violent confrontation; (b) preventing a conflict from spilling over to other areas; and (c) preventing the resurgence of violence in a post conflict situation. For example, the 2001 Gothenburg Program states, for instance, that “successful conflict prevention relies on preparedness to take action before a situation deteriorates into violence.”⁵⁹ However, a more comprehensive definition is

⁵³Dalia, D. ‘The European Union’s Humanitarian Aid and Cooperation with Partners: The Framework Partnership Agreements’ in Cosgrove-Sacks C. & Santos C., *Europe, Diplomacy and Development*, Pelgrave, New York, 2001, p.171.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵Cosgrove-Sacks, C, ‘The EU as an International Actor’ in Cosgrove-Sacks C. & Santos C., *Europe, Diplomacy and Development*, Pelgrave, New York, 2001, pp.3-28; Olsen, 2007, p. 15.

⁵⁶This definition can be found on European Commission’s site at:

<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/definition.htm> (accessed March 2007).

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Report presented to the Nice European Council by the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission on “Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of European Union Action in the Field of Conflict Prevention,” Press release 14088/00, Brussels 30 November 2000.

⁵⁹European Council, the Gothenburg Program, 15-16 June 2001.

given by the European Peace Liason Office (EPLO), which states that conflict prevention refers to long-term activities to reduce structural tensions or prevent the outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violence. Conflict prevention denotes the full range of activities oriented to this aim, such as, early warning, crisis management, peace-keeping, peace-building, conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation.⁶⁰

Beyond the EU's definition of conflict prevention, it is important to distinguish the differentiation between conflict prevention and the overall dimension of the EU's foreign policy objectives, such as development aid, humanitarian assistance, democracy support and human rights promotion. But Johansson warns that confusion can be compounded by the integrated approach adopted by the EU in matters of treating the root causes of conflict. In this context, the Commission states that "development policy and other co-operation programs provide, without doubt, the most powerful instruments at the Community's disposal for treating the root causes of conflict."⁶¹ These root causes have been identified (for example, in the ESS) to be the result of: mal-governance, government illegitimacy, repression of minority, proliferation of arms, economic degradation, migration, lack of full civil society participation or regional instability.⁶²

However, a significant question emerges in academic literature as to whether or not the EU has conceptually combined normal peaceful relations between countries into a broad, umbrella concept of conflict prevention? Barbe and Johanson point at the danger implied in the "confusion between EU's general external policy aims and a conflict prevention program, in that leads to a clear securitization of normal, peaceful international relations."⁶³ And Lund's argument is that there could be a "misleading tendency to equate conflict prevention with one or other of the broad ideals of the ascendant liberal internationalist agenda, such as market-oriented economic reform, democracy, human rights, rule of law, arms control and open trade (...) promoting these global themes does not necessarily prevent a violent conflict."⁶⁴

This notion was also reflected in the International Crisis Group's Report (ICG). While evaluating the EU's involvement in conflict prevention, the ICG asserted that that "the EU does not evaluate appropriately the impact of its conflict prevention policies against their purposes. In fact, the EU seems to rely on the assumption that development cooperation and support for democratization and conduct of elections *ipso facto* support long-term or structural conflict prevention."⁶⁵ The ICG pointed out that although they do, the effect is not uniform across the countries the EU has been involved in.

For Barbe and Johansson, insofar as the EU's development cooperation, aid and support for democracy, human and minority rights are factors which may contribute

⁶⁰The European Peace-building Liason Office, 2001.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²European Council, "A Secure Europe in a Better World," European Security Strategy adopted by the *European Council*, 13 December 2003.

⁶³Barbé E. and E. Johansson, 'EU and Conflict Prevention,' *Observatori de Política Exterior Europea*, Working Paper No. 8. October 2001, p.10.

⁶⁴Lund, M. 'Preventing Violent Conflicts: Progress and Shortfall', in Peter Cross (ed.), *Contributing to Preventive Action*, CPN Yearbook, Baden-Baden, 1998.

⁶⁵International Crisis Group, *Katanga: Congo's Forgotten Crisis*, Report No. 103, 9 January, 2006.

positively to conflict prevention, it is necessary to assess their effect and they should not be “used blindly as a ‘cure-all formula’.”⁶⁶ This view is also expressed by other analysts, for example, Smith who observes that conflict prevention is an openly political activity, quite different from the different apolitical instruments implemented by some of the EU policies, like development aid and humanitarian aid. Hence, the support of state reformation in pre-conflict, early warning or post-conflict situations is a lucid prevention measure because the strong focus on directing external aid and EU support of state reformation, reflect the increasing recognition that *technical* assistance and the *apolitical* measures alone are not substantive enough to bring about expected results. And yet, as Arts and Dickson warn, purely technical assistance may indeed lead to a perpetuation, or even aggravation, of many problems one had originally wanted to change.⁶⁷

b. The CFSP and Africa:

In the period after the Cold War, security problems in Africa became a special concern of the European Union, mainly because of the growth in number of violent conflicts.⁶⁸ The need to focus on conflicts and conflict prevention in Africa was specifically initiated by the European Commission as early as 1993, when it introduced the first initiative on ‘Peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution in Africa.’ This was, in fact, before the real increase in the multitude of violent conflicts had become part of the general international perception about Africa.⁶⁹

Along with focusing on development aid, parallel to conflict prevention, the EU aimed at enhancing African capacity in managing conflict. This was manifesting in a number of initiatives that sought to develop closer relations between EU and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). From the beginning, the notion reflected in the debate with the OAU was that conflict prevention and conflict resolution were primarily the responsibility of the Africans themselves. Therefore, the EU’s summit in Essen in December 1994 called for “an intensive political dialogue between the EU and OAU in particular regarding conflict prevention in Africa.”⁷⁰ In December 1995, the EU Summit in Madrid officially made the security problems of Africa a public concern of Europe.⁷¹ Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that parallel to the Madrid declaration, it is the time when the Western European Union (WEU) began to recognize the need for national forces, which could be made available for preventive operations in Africa and mainly for support and reinforcement actions.⁷²

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Arts, K., and A. Dickson (eds), *EU development cooperation: from model to symbol*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, UK, 2004.

⁶⁸Pinheiro, J. de D., ‘Peace-Building and Conflict Prevention in Africa’, *European Commission*, Directorate General for Development, Brussels, 1999.

⁶⁹Landgraf, M., ‘Peace-building and conflict prevention in Africa: A view from the European Commission,’ in U. Engel & A. Mehler, *Gewaltsame Konflikte und ihre Prävention in Afrika*, Institut für Afrika-Kunde, Hamburg:, 1998, p.103.

⁷⁰ Ibid. p.105.

⁷¹European Council (Madrid Summit 1995), Madrid, 15-16 December 1995.

⁷²Lenzi, G., “WEU’s role in sub-Saharan Africa”, in W. Khüne, G. Lenzi & A. Vasconcelos, *WEU’s Role in Crisis management and Conflict Resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Institute for Security Studies of WEU, Paris, 1995, p.45.

In March 1996, the European Commission released a 'communication' on conflict and conflict prevention in Africa, emphasising that the use of development aid and related instruments (Petersburg Tasks⁷³) were considered to be important to the European Union. In June 1997, a 'common position' was reached, which clearly stressed that conflict prevention was a priority of the EU. It made reference to the need for implementation of the defence implications of EU actions within the initiative on conflict prevention by the WEU. Shortly after this, the Council of Development Ministers reached agreement on a resolution that clearly indicated that conflict prevention was now a main concern of the European Community in general.⁷⁴

At the French-British summit in December 1998 in St. Malo, important decisions were reached, which showed that the former two colonial powers recognised the need to end the competition over influence in Africa.⁷⁵ After this, the function of Africa as a potential element in the EU's endeavours to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was pointed out, for example, by *The Guardian* that Africa is a handy platform for high-profile cooperation between Europe's biggest military powers at a time.⁷⁶ This argument was also very much in line with the thinking about Africa within the WEU framework. For instance, Lenzi noted that "sub-Saharan Africa was important because the region "is an area for Petersberg missions" and it can also contribute to "a global affirmation of the European Security and Defence identity."⁷⁷

In December 1999, the Helsinki European Council established a common European Headline Goal (HG) to develop European military capabilities by 2003, which were able to deploy within 60 days, and to sustain for at least one year operationally capable forces of up to 60,000 troops called the Rapid Reaction Forces (RRFs). This HG included agreement on developing collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport, to enable the EU to carry out the full range of the "Petersberg" tasks.⁷⁸

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), which focuses on peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution policies,⁷⁹ is another significant example. The CPA provided a framework against which policy statements and initiatives were adopted. These protocols stress the importance of the development policy as a crucial

⁷³The Petersburg Tasks were constructed at a Western European Union council meeting in Petersburg, Germany in 1992. They defined the type and scope of military tasks the WEU can undertake. These tasks are classified as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and crisis management including the deployment of combat troops in peacemaking. The Petersburg Tasks were later adopted as EU policy in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and provide the framework for the European Security and Defense Policy.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ *The Guardian*, 12.03.99

⁷⁷ Lenzi, G., 1995, "WEU's role in sub-Saharan Africa", in W. Khüne, G. Lenzi & A. Vasconcelos, *WEU's Role in Crisis management and Conflict Resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Institute for Security Studies of WEU, Paris, 64 & 63

⁷⁸ Duke, S., *The EU and Crisis Management: Development and Prospects*, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, 2002.

⁷⁹ In Article 11 stresses that "in situations of violent conflict, the Parties shall take all suitable action to prevent an intensification of violence (...) The Parties shall ensure the creation of the necessary links between emergency measures, rehabilitation and development co-operation" (Cotonou Partnership Agreement 23 June 2000).

instrument for addressing the ‘root’ causes of conflict. These instruments are expected to be part of the EU’s integrated approach, which is complementary to other direct and indirect EU tools for conflict prevention. In May 2001, the Council of the European Union adopted a *Common position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa*, which in its preamble recalls the Cotonou Agreement. A month later, following a proposal by the EU’s CFSP High Representative, the European Council meeting in Gothenburg adopted *EU’s Program for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts*.⁸⁰ In the same year, the *Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)*⁸¹ was launched.

In the context of Africa’s crises, the RRM and RRF concept was first tested in the Great Lakes region, particularly in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), when in June 2003, the EU deployed a French-led military operation to Bunia, capital of Ituri, in the DRC. The operation code-named *Artemis*, deployed 14,000 personnel with the aim of contributing to the stabilisation of security conditions, improving the humanitarian situation, and protecting refugees. It was a temporary mission lasting three months until handing over to the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic (UN MONUC) in September 2003.⁸² In the context of the CFSP, *Artemis* was significant in that it was the first ‘autonomous’ (independent of NATO) EU military mission under the ESDP, deployed outside of Europe. Secondly, it proved how European Member states could join their forces and instruments in order to prevent a crisis from escalating into violence; lastly, it led to new ways of conceptualising and responding to crises, which spearheaded a number of significant developments regarding the EU’s approach to conflict prevention.

The first of these developments concerns the new Battle group concept, which is regarded as an important part of the implementation of the defence aspects of the 2003 European Security Strategy and also as an integral part of the new Headline Goal 2010 (that follows on from the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal). The idea of developing such a concept was initially floated at a bi-lateral Franco-British summit in Le Touquet on 4 February 2003 and was made more explicit in the 24 November 2003 meeting in London, when the two powers recognised the need to build upon the precedent *Artemis* and establish “credible Battle group sized forces” so as to strengthen the EU’s rapid reaction capability, which would support the United

⁸⁰ European Council, *EU Program for the prevention of violent conflicts*, Gothenburg, 15-16 June 2001.

⁸¹The RRF is a Community-funded mechanism is designed to allow the EC to respond rapidly and flexibly manner to the needs of countries faced with natural disasters or conflict. In crisis situations, it functions as a bridge back to the EC’s non-crisis assistance programmes that support short-term initiatives, with the aim of safeguarding or re-establishing favourable working conditions. The RRM is designed to avoid any activities that could overlap with humanitarian assistance handled by European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). Since 2001, the RRM has been used to respond to regional or country-level programmes around the world including election support, tsunami-affected countries, and boarder assistance. Furthermore, a number of RRM projects have been implemented in conflict prevention and peace-building. As a transitional relief measure, RRM usually follows EC humanitarian aid and/or the civil protection mechanism. For details, see “Civilian crisis management: the EU way”, *Chaillot Paper No. 90*, June 2006, p.51.

⁸²Faria, F., ‘Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of the European Union,’ *European Union Institute of Security Studies*, Occasional Paper, Paris, 2004.

Nations' operations.⁸³ Soon after, the EU published the Council's Joint action on 27 April 2006, "on the European Union military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process" in the presidential and parliamentary election process in July 2006. This mission implied the return of EU forces to the DRC for the first time since Operation Artemis. This was undertaken at the request from the UN Secretary General on 27 December 2005. The EU force (EUFOR RD Congo) was launched and it was stationed in the capital, Kinshasa, mainly as a "deterrent force" in order to prevent or (if necessary) contain acts of armed violence in the capital. The electoral process – the first to have been launched since the country became the DRC on 17 May 1997 - was successful and the first democratic elections took place in the country with Kabila being reinstated as President. A very significant outcome of this mission was the fact that it helped in leading the country into the first ever democratic elections since independence in the 1960s.⁸⁴

Another significant issue, on the part of the EU, is that the *post-Artemis* period was marked by a shift in ideas from a top-heavy, 60,000-strong Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to smaller units. In November 2004, the Defence Ministers of the EU member states at the Military Capabilities Commitment Conference to establish 13 "battle groups." Each BG could number 1,500 men and could be deployable rapidly for crisis management around the world, rather than pursue the strong RRF. The establishment of these groups started in 2005, and were expected to become fully operational by 2007. In response to a crisis, or to an urgent request by the UN, the EU should be able to undertake two Battle group-sized operations for a period of up to 120 days simultaneously. Forces should be on the ground no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation.⁸⁵ In addition to this, a *Civilian Cell* is being developed, which will assist in coordinating civilian operations and have responsibility for generating the capacity to plan and run autonomous EU military operations.⁸⁶

Secondly, not only based on the experience of *Artemis*, and other EU Missions (for example in Afghanistan, and Former Yugoslavian republic of Macedonia (FYRoM) including the impact of the September 11 2001 terrorist attack in the US, the wider security dialogue was shifted to include the public in the EU external and defence policy areas. In fact, this led to further implementation of the EU's concept of security and the adoption of the *European Security Strategy (ESS)* in December 2003.⁸⁷ Apart from terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), state failure, and organised crime, the ESS highlights regional conflicts within the EU's neighbourhood and the world as areas of its concern. This is because they impact on "European interests directly or indirectly and can lead to extremism, terrorism and

⁸³Quille, G., "The EU Battle Groups," *Directorate General for External Policies of the European Union*, DGExPo/B/PolDep/Note/2006_145, Brussels, 12 September 2006.

⁸⁴Ignacio Gutierrez, "European Union Operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – Reply to the annual report of the Council" *Document A/1954, Brussels 20 December, 2006*, http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2006/1954.php#P115_9294 (accessed at 20 June 2007).

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶ Bayne S., C. Gourlay & H. Ojanen, "Developing International Capacities for Crisis Management and Crisis response in Africa" *Finnish Institute of International Affairs & the Centre for International Cooperation and Security*, Paper 2, Helsinki, 2006, p.14.

⁸⁷ Ibid.; ECDPM, 2006, p.26; Olsen, 2006, pp.162-164

state failure.”⁸⁸ Furthermore, the ESS strongly emphasises that security is a precondition for development. In the understanding of the ECPDM, the vision of the ESS is “broad and comprehensive and does not confine itself to traditional notions of ‘hard’ security. The Strategy also acknowledges the influence and interplay of different areas of EU external policies. In doing so, it recognises the value of the work that has been done for years by the development side in supporting measures to promote good governance and conflict prevention (...).”⁸⁹ This also demonstrates the need to re-model coherence, co-ordination, and consistency within the EU’s external policies in dealing, particularly, with developing countries and in the context of this paper, Africa is central to this debate.

Thirdly, in the continuous search for complementariness between the CFSP and the development cooperation, the European Commission re-launched the *EU-Africa dialogue* in June 2003.⁹⁰ This was meant to provide impetus to what was agreed upon at the first EU-Africa Summit in April 2000 in Cairo, which focused on making efforts towards building a strategic partnership with Africa.⁹¹

From a global perspective, the focus on peace, stability and security by the ESS, does not only highlight the recent awareness in international discourse that these conditions are crucial for the promotion of development, but it also highlights Europe’s desire to adapt its external policies to the changing global security environment in the post-9/11 era. In this sense, re-thinking and re-designing the EU’s policy towards developing countries has become a necessity.

Therefore, the 2003 Communication on the EU-Africa dialogue proposed the strengthening of institutional links to help Africa deal with the political problems and development-related issues it faces.⁹² Some effects of this goal came in December 2003, when the EU Council adopted the decision on the financing of a *Peace Facility for Africa (APF)* from European Development Fund resources. This move was in response to a request made at the AU summit and is intended to support African institutions and peacekeeping measures. The APF is meant to ensure cooperation between the AU, regional organisations in Africa,⁹³ the EU and the United Nations.

⁸⁸ See the European Security Strategy (ESS) - *A Secure Europe in a Better World* in December 2003.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council: The EU-Africa dialogue, [COM(2003) 316 final – Not published in the Official Journal].

⁹¹ A Plan of Action was adopted that focuses: economic issues, particularly regional economic cooperation and integration in Africa; integrating Africa into the world economy; deepening the link between trade and development at international level in order to ensure that trade liberalisation contributes to poverty reduction is one of the objectives of the partnership; respect for, and protection of, human rights, democratic principles and institutions, the rule of law and good governance; peace-building and conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa; and development measures to combat poverty (in the areas of education, health and food security, for example). New areas of cooperation include the situation in Sudan and the Great Lakes and the fight against terrorism.

⁹² European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council: The EU-Africa dialogue, [COM(2003) 316 final - Not published in the Official Journal].

⁹³ Apart from sub-regional organizations, these institutions include the African Union (AU) created in March 2001 to replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The AU provides a framework for, and strengthens, political and economic regional cooperation and integration between African countries. Also, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was developed by African states with a commitment on the part of Africans to co-operate towards eradicating poverty and promoting sustainable development and growth (See, Kimunguyi, 2006).

More notably, in response to the situation in Sudan, the EU and its Member States have been providing a wide range of support to the African Union's (AU) efforts to help stabilise the situation in Darfur since January 2004⁹⁴ after the launch of the APF. This support has included financial, personnel and political support to the Abuja talks process and the Ceasefire Commission. It also includes support to the AU Mission in the Darfur region of Sudan (AMIS) through the provision of equipment and assets, planning and technical assistance, military observers, training of African troops and civilian police officers and strategic transportation (EU civilian-military supporting action, which was also coordinated under the auspices of NATO under the Berlin-Plus Agreements). In the same period, EU Member States have provided coordinated strategic airlifts for well over 2,000 African Union personnel. The provision of airlift continues in 2007. Since July 2005, the EU has a Special Representative (EUSR) for Sudan. The EUSR, currently Mr Torben Brylle, who was appointed in May 2007, ensures coordination and coherence of the EU's contributions to AMIS. He is assisted by a team of roughly 200 EU military and police advisers based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.⁹⁵

Apart from the APF, the EU-AU dialogue has also been intensified and so far there are a number of notable achieved results in a number of ways. In 2005 the EU undertook to increase public “development aid by EUR 20 billion per year by 2010, (...) of which over half “will be earmarked for Africa.”⁹⁶ A new *Strategy for Africa (SA)* was also adopted in October 2005 to further support the continent's efforts to achieve the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals, (MDGs). In the first instance, AS proposes forging a strategic security and development partnership between the EU and Africa. The AS focuses, mainly on key requirements for sustainable development such as peace and security, good and effective governance, trade, interconnectivity, social cohesion and environmental sustainability. New initiatives have also been launched, most notably, a governance initiative and a Euro-African Partnership for Infrastructure, which was launched in July 2006. Under the Governance Initiative, the EU will, for instance, provide support for reforms triggered by the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of the African Union, a unique tool for peer review and peer learning in good democratic governance by and for Africans. And in the context of the Partnership for Infrastructure, the EU will support programmes that facilitate interconnectivity at continental level to promote regional trade, integration, stability and development.⁹⁷

Furthermore, two years after the adoption of the Strategy for Africa, the EU and Africa will re-define their partnership through the adoption of a *Joint EU-Africa Strategy*, to be adopted at the second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in December 2007. According to the European Commission, the Joint EU-Africa Strategy will outline a long term shared vision of the future of EU-Africa relations in a globalised world. The Commission also expects that the Lisbon Summit will seek further reinvention of the

⁹⁴The EU has committed a total of EUR 242 million from the African Peace Facility in support of AMIS since June 2004. European Union - Fact Sheet, *EU support to the African Union Mission in Darfur – AMIS II/06*, May 2007, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/070507-factsheet6-AMIS_II.pdf (accessed 20 June 2007).

⁹⁵Cazalles, C., “The EU as an International Organisation: the case of Darfur,” *Centre of Strategic Analysis*, Paris, 2007, p.22.

⁹⁶European Commission, <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12106.htm> (accessed 26 May 2007).

⁹⁷ Ibid.

EU-Africa partnership.⁹⁸ For example, the Joint Strategy aims to strengthen the EU-Africa political dialogue so as to bring the EU-Africa partnership: (1) beyond development cooperation by opening up the EU-Africa dialogue to issues of joint political concern and interest; (2) beyond Africa by moving away from a focus on Africa matters only and openly addressing European and global issues of concern and to act accordingly in the relevant fora to make globalisation work for all; (3) beyond fragmentation in supporting Africa's aspirations to find regional and continental responses to some of the most important challenges; (4) beyond institutions in ensuring a better participation of African and European citizens, as part of an overall strategy to strengthen civil society in the two continents. Further joint EU-Africa policy initiatives that would also be discussed on this occasion include Partnership on Energy, Climate Change; Migration, Mobility and Employment; Democratic Governance and EU-Africa political and institutional architecture.⁹⁹

Conclusion

This paper has identified some of the factors making Africa a centre of concern for the EU, especially in the area of development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. The first one regards the historical links based on the colonial legacy that has developed into the post-colonial period, which are a basis of the EU-ACP development cooperation. The second one regards the strong economic links between the two groups through trade and investment. The EU is the main trading partner with many African countries, and the main ODA donor for most countries in Africa.

The third factor concerns the EU's the ambition to become a major international actor. To this end, it has since the 1990s, developed (in the context of this paper) its CSFP/ESDP instruments (military and civilian) for crisis management. Conflict prevention, and especially the EU's focus on Africa, would also help it in realising this ambition. In this regard, the EU has re-invented development cooperation into a civilian instrument that could help in preventing conflict for example through political conditionality and democracy building, and political dialogue, which is to be sealed through the *Joint EU-Africa Strategy* in Lisbon 2007. The EU has also developed its instruments of humanitarian response to crises, especially through ECHO. The EU has declared its commitment to working with multilateral institutions such as supporting the AU and UN's peace keeping operations in Sudan and the Great Lakes (DRC), and also declared its commitment to the MDGs.

Lastly, by focusing on Africa, the EU would, in fact, be targeting security threats it faces. The ESS identified these as terrorism, illegal migration, refugees, human trafficking, illicit trade in arms and drugs and state failure, which are located in the world's poorest regions.¹⁰⁰ It is no surprise that given these perceived security threats and the proximity of Africa, the EU has strongly committed itself to development cooperation and conflict prevention in Africa.

⁹⁸European Commission, *Commission Adopts a Communication on the Future Joint EU-Africa Strategy*, IP/07/947, Brussels, 27 June 2007 (accessed 13 July 2007).

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰European Council, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12, December 2003.

Bibliography

- Arts, K., and A. Dickson (eds), *EU development cooperation: from model to symbol*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, UK, 2004.
- Bayne S., C. Gourlay & H. Ojanen, "Developing International Capacities for Crisis Management and Crisis response in Africa" *Finnish Institute of International Affairs & the Centre for International Cooperation and Security*, Paper 2, Helsinki, 2006, p.14.
- Barbé E. and E. Johansson, 'EU and Conflict Prevention,' *Observatori de Política Exterior Europea*, Working Paper No. 8. October 2001, p.10.
- Bretherton, C. and J. Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, London: Routledge, 1999.
- Cazalles, C., "The EU as an International Organisation: the case of Darfur," *Centre of Strategic Analysis*, Paris, 2007, p.22.
- Cameron, F., 'The EU as a Global Actor: far from pushing its political weight around', in C. Rhodes (Ed), *The EU in the World Community*, Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp.19-44
- Carl, G., 'Return to Colonialism? The New Orientation of European Development Assistance,' in Marjorie Lister (ed.), *New Perspectives on European Union Development Cooperation*, West View Press, 1999, p.116.
- Cosgrove-Sacks, C, 'The EU as an International Actor' in Cosgrove-Sacks C. & Santos C., *Europe, Diplomacy and Development*, Pelgrave, New York, 2001, pp.3-28;
- Dalia, D. 'The European Union's Humanitarian Aid and Cooperation with Partners: The Framework Partnership Agreements' in Cosgrove-Sacks C. & Santos C., *Europe, Diplomacy and Development*, Pelgrave, New York, 2001, p.171.
- Duke, S., *The EU and Crisis Management: Development and Prospects*, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, 2002.
- ECPDM, *Innovations in the Cotonou Agreement (4)*, Cotonou European Centre for Policy Development and management, *Cotonou Infokit*, Maastricht, 2001.
- European Commission, *The Reform of the Management of the European Community's External Assistance: An Overview* Report October 2002.
- European Commission, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/definition.htm> (accessed March 2007).
- European Commission, *Communication from the Commission on Assessment and Future of Community Humanitarian Activities*, [COM(99)468 final, Brussels, 26 November 1999.
- European Commission, *Key Figures of ECHO humanitarian Assistance*, at http://ec.europa.eu/echo/statistics/echo_en.htm (accessed at 24 June 2007).
- European Commission, *EU support to the African Union Mission in Darfur*, Fact Sheet, AMIS II/06, May 2007, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/070507-factsheet6-AMIS_II.pdf (accessed 20 June 2007).
- European Commission, *Commission Adopts a Communication on the Future Joint EU-Africa Strategy*, IP/07/947, Brussels, 27 June 2007 (accessed 13 July 2007).
- European Commission, *Report presented to the Nice European Council by the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission on "Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of European Union Action in the Field of Conflict Prevention,"* Press release 14088/00, Brussels, 30 November 2000.
- European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the Council: The EU-Africa dialogue*, [COM(2003) 316 final – Not published in the Official Journal].
- European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the Council: The EU-Africa dialogue*, [COM(2003) 316 final - Not published in the Official Journal].
- European Council, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12, December 2003.
- European Council, 'Resolution of General Affairs and External Relations Council [8817/05],' Brussels 24 May 2005.
- European Council (Madrid Summit 1995), Madrid, 15-16 December 1995.
- European Council, *The Role of Development Cooperation in strengthening peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution*, Conclusions adopted by Development Council on 30 November 1998.
- European Council, *Presidency Conclusions: Brussels European Council 16 and 17 June*, Brussels 15 July 2005.
- Faria, F., 'Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of the European Union,' *European Union Institute of Security Studies*, Occasional Paper, Paris, 2004.
- First Convention of Lome, signed 28 February 1975

- Haglund, A., "The EU and Humanitarian Assistance," in Cosgrove-Sacks C. & Santos C., *Europe, Diplomacy and Development*, Palgrave, New York, 2001, pp.154-155; Olsen 2006, p.15.
- Hill, C. and Smith, M., "International Relations and the European Union: Themes and Issues" in C. Hill, and M. Smith (eds), *International Relations and the European Union*, Oxford University Press, 2005
- Holland, M., *The European Union and the Third World*, Palgrave, Hampshire, 2002, p.100,
- Ignacio Gutierrez, "European Union Operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – Reply to the annual report of the Council" *Document A/1954, Brussels 20 December, 2006*, http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2006/1954.php#P115_9294 (accesse at 20 June 2007).
- International Crisis Group, *Katanga: Congo's Forgotten Crisis*, Report No. 103, 9 January, 2006.
- International Security Information Service, Europe, 'Operation Artemis: Mission Improbable?' *European Security Review*, No. 18, July 2003. For details, visit, <http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/download/operation%20artemis,%20mission%20improbable%20-%20esr%2018.pdf> (accessed 26 May 2007).
- Kimunguyi P., 'From Lome to Cotonou: An Assessment of the European Union's Trade Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries,' *Journal of International Relations No. 33:1-2*, Warsaw University, Scholar Publishers, July 2006;
- Kimunguyi, P., 'Changing Paradigms or Symbolic Rhetoric? Perspectives on the European Union's Development policy,' Conference Paper prepared for the 29th Annual Conference of African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific, Macquarie University, Sydney 20-22 September 2006.
- Kimunguyi P., 'The European Union and Developing Countries: The Challenges of Trade Liberalisation in the Cotonou Process', refereed paper presented at *The 3rd Conference of European Union and Asia Pacific Association of European Studies*, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan (8-10 December, 2005), can be accessed at, http://www.soc.nii.ac.jp/eusa-japan/download/eusa_ap/paper_PatrickKimunguyi.pdf;
- Kimunguyi, P., 'AID: A Critical Review of the Dialogue on 'Poorly Performing Countries'', *Journal of International Relations*, No.31:1-2, University of Warsaw, Scholar Publishers, 2005, pp.155-172.
- Landgraf, M., 'Peace-building and conflict prevention in Africa: A view from the European Commission,' in U. Engel & A. Mehler, *Gewaltsame Konflikte und ihre Prävention in Afrika*, Institut für Afrika-Kunde, Hamburg., 1998, p.103.
- Lenzi, G., "WEU's role in sub-Saharan Africa", in W. Khüne, G. Lenzi & A. Vasconcelos, *WEU's Role in Crisis management and Conflict Resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Institute for Security Studies of WEU, Paris, 1995, p.45.
- Lund, M. 'Preventing Violent Conflicts: Progress and Shortfall', in Peter Cross (ed.), *Contributing to Preventive Action*, CPN Yearbook, Baden-Baden, 1998.
- Loisel, S., 'The Politicisation of the EU-ACP Relationship after the Cold War', paper prepared for the 33rd ACES Annual and 8th Research Conference, Newcastle, 2-4 September 2003.
- Lund, M. 'Preventing Violent Conflicts: Progress and Shortfall', in Peter Cross (ed.), *Contributing to Preventive Action*, CPN Yearbook, Baden-Baden, 1998.
- Macrae, J. & A. Harmer (2004) (eds.) *Beyond the continuum. The changing role of aid policy in protracted crises*, London: ODI, HPG Report 18 July 2004.
- Madhias A., and D. Tomas, 'The European Union and the Transformation of Conflicts: Theory and the Impact of Integration,' Paper presented at the *CESA/SA Convention*, Cape Town University, South Africa, 2-6 June 2006.
- Nowak A., C. Gourlay (eds), *Civilian crisis management: the EU Way*, Chaillot Paper No. 90, EU Institute of Security Studies, June 2006.
- Olsen, R., "Between development policy and foreign policy ambitions: The European Union Strategy for Africa" Paper prepared for *EUSA 10th Biennial International Conference*, Montreal, May 17-May 19, 2007.
- Olsen, G. R., 'Challenges to Traditional Policy Options, Opportunities for New Choices: The Africa Policy of the EU' *The Round Table*, Volume 93, No. 375, July 2004, pp.425-436.
- Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Development Co-operation Report 2005*, Paris, 2006.
- Pinheiro, J. de D., 'Peace-Building and Conflict Prevention in Africa', *European Commission, Directorate General for Development*, Brussels, 1999.
- Przetakiewicz, J., 'The European Community Humanitarian Office: A Political Tool?', *Collegium - Journal of College of Europe*, No.12. October 1998, pp.42-45.

- Quille, G., 'The EU Battle Groups,' *Directorate General for External Policies of the European Union*, DGExPo/B/PolDep/Note/2006_145, Brussels, 12 September 2006.
- Reiterer, M., 'Inter-regionalism: A New Diplomatic Tool, European Experience in East Asia,' Paper presented at the 3rd *Conference of European Union and Asia Pacific Association of European Studies*, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan (8-10 December, 2005), www.soc.nii.ac.jp/eusa-japan/download/eusa_ap/paper_MichaelReiterer.pdf (accessed at 24 May 2007).
- Young, R., "European Union Democracy Promotion Policies: Ten Years On," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 6, 2001, p.355-373.